

# The weight of history

## Reviving 'big picture' sociology in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

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### *Keynote*

In this paper I reflect on key arguments of my recent book, *The Return of Inequality: Social Change and the Weight of the Past* (Savage 2021), which has recently been translated into German by Hamburger Press. I wrote this book because I felt sociologists need to offer 'big picture' accounts of social change, of the kind that canonical social theorists of modernity attempted during the later 19<sup>th</sup> century and into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although this kind of 'big picture' sociology remained strong right up until the early 21<sup>st</sup> century – as in the work of Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, or Zygmunt Bauman – I have become disturbed that sociologists have largely retreated into specialist niches and increasingly shied away from such ambitious thinking. To borrow Monika Krause's arguments, we need to restore a concept of sociology as a diagnostic of zeitgeist. In her words:

The concept of zeitgeist – literally “spirit of the times” – (is) a tool for sociological analysis. I propose we understand zeitgeist as a hypothesis for a pattern in meaningful practices that is specific to a particular historical time-period, links different realms of social life and social groups, and extends across geographical contexts. (Krause 2019, p. 1)

To be sure, I am sceptical of overly generalising accounts of zeitgeist, in which broad terms – such as 'risk society' or 'late modernity' – stand in for nuanced and careful diagnoses of social relations. Nonetheless, the responsibility lies with us to develop the appropriate conceptual framing. In recent years I have been struck by the way that non sociologists have come to dominate this discussion of long-term social trends, whereas sociologists have become far more cautious. Consider the bold statements about human progress in Yuval Harari's bestselling history book *Sapiens*, for example. Closer to home, the banner of 'inequality' provided a ready hook for hanging the sense of malaise that beset many nations after the 2008 financial crash. The popular appeal of Thomas Piketty's (2014) *Capital in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, a heavyweight monograph was able to crystallise highly technical economic analysis with a crisp narrative about how inequality was on the return. Numerous other economists also provided this kind of 'big picture' statement on inequality, such as Branko Milanovic's (2016) *Global Inequality* reflecting on how the rise of the developing world was changing global inequalities. I do not want to address here the scientific rigour of these works – which has certainly been contested – but only to note that the skilful deployment of data and visualisations allied to a compelling historical narrative seemed highly effective in communicating a vision of the zeitgeist – in the manner that Susan Halford and I (Halford and Savage 2017) referred to as 'symphonic social science'.

Yet, despite the evident appeal of this public social science, sociologists somehow seemed reluctant to step up to the plate. This is remarkable given that sociology has for much of its history led the way in elaborating broad brush and synthesising narratives. Indeed, it was this concern to synthesise broad historical shifts that led scholars such as Weber, Durkheim and Du Bois to take up the sociological mantle. It is even more startling when we realise that the analysis of inequality in all its varied and intersecting forms – and especially with respect to class, gender, race – has long been a central concern of sociology. So why are economists, epidemiologists, and applied social scientists leading the way?

This was the reason I was determined for my book to consider how the return of socio-economic inequality is not simply a matter of economic distributions but poses far larger challenges to the social fabric. Reflecting on this issue forced me to realise that the sociological armoury was itself under pressure because of our weddedness to the now fading concept of ‘modernity’. Sociologists of all hues have taken some version of the modernity concept as the frame on which to analyse social relations. Yet, although the concept of modernity seems to gesture to historical shifts, it does so in a limited and ultimately restrictive way – by delineating some kind of ‘now time’ (the period of modernity whose zeitgeist sociologists are able to diagnose) – from some kind of previous time (notably, the past of ‘tradition’). This simple dichotomy is underpinned by the temporal consciousness of modernity itself, with its differentiation between past, present and future, and its neglect of *duration*, in Bergson’s now largely forgotten words. The result is that sociology has increasingly fallen back on a simplistic ‘epochalism’ (Savage 2009). This problem has got worse as the period of modernity has become more extended since its supposed inception from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Even those sociologists such as Beck and Giddens who tried to drag out the modernist narrative by periodising its various permutations of post-, late- or reflexive modernity have run out of road. Hartmut Rosa’s theory of ‘social acceleration’ is perhaps the last word in this attempt to renew modernist thinking.

Put simply, my book argues that we need to challenge this framing of modernity which is no longer giving us the right kind of leverage to diagnose contemporary issues. We should not assume that because we are somehow economically advanced or technically sophisticated we have thereby left behind our historical precursors. Indeed, we might actually be seeing the resurgence of the very social forms which previous sociologists had banished under the banner of ‘tradition’. Elitism, inheritance, authoritarianism, entitlement, patronage are returning with a vengeance. Such is the hold of modernist framings in the social sciences that we still routinely default to ideas that render the power of the past in passive terms – as some kind of ‘relic’, ‘legacy’, ‘residue’ or ‘context’. Endemic though these terms are, they do not adequately convey that history is not just some passive backdrop on which contemporary affairs take place, but *actually exerts agency on the future*. In this respect I took Piketty’s contentious economic formula  $r > g$ , i.e. that the rate of return on capital tends to be greater than the economic growth rate as a whole, as the underpinning of an alternative way of understanding social change. The return of inequality, and more precisely, the ‘return of capital’ (Piketty and Zucman 2014) involves the revival of accumulated advantage and privilege, and thus marks the ‘weight of history’.

I completed my book in the summer of 2020, just as the COVID-19 pandemic gripped the world. But, although my book came too early to reflect on this terrifying phenomenon, I soon came to think that it endorsed its fundamental claims. COVID-19 came as a surprise to policy-makers, the public, and to social scientists, even though from the perspective of long-term history there is nothing surprising or novel about it at all. Pandemics have been central drivers for social life throughout human history (see, famously if glibly Diamond 2013), and what a modern conceit it was to assume that they could be kept at bay. Furthermore, COVID led to numerous outcomes, such as the return of ‘working from home’, or amplified divides between service workers, exposed to the full force of the virus and privileged elites who could easily adapt to home working, benefitting from all the services of the gig economy which mark a return to long term historical norms. It all sounds rather like the Roman empire revisited.

I was also struck by how COVID-19 fully exposed the fragility – and not the success – of modern arrangements. Like previous pandemics it depended on global contact and could not be confined within nation states. It thus testifies to Bhabra's (2016) recognition of a connected sociology, which is scornful of the way that concepts of modernity and modernisation routinely demarcated between the developed, 'modern' worlds and the undeveloped, 'traditional' ones. It thus reveals the limitations of the modern nation state. Furthermore, COVID-19 was not a particularly serious epidemic, with less than 2% of those affected in the early phases dying, very tame compared to the way that smallpox ravaged the Americas in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, or the Black Death killed a third of Europeans in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. However, despite being a mild pandemic in historical terms, COVID-19 has posed fundamental challenges to economic, social and political arrangements in a way which previous, more serious, pandemics largely did not. It thus exposed the fragility of modern institutions. Modernity, far from being some sophisticated set of arrangements which can cope with stress, turns out to be very frail indeed – a rather thin institutional paper covering deep structural cracks in the social fabric.

The more I mulled over these issues, the more I thought that the characteristic default of sociology towards a national level of inquiry was missing the fact that we are living in a different zeitgeist when transnational territoriality is returning, and more specifically we are witnessing the revival of imperial projects – not just as some kind of residual resurgence of past European empires, but in new and visceral ways. Indeed, as Will Davies (2022) pointed out in his review of my book, the Russian attack on Ukraine seemingly endorsed the direction of my broad arguments.

Of course, extensive criticisms of 'methodological nationalism' have been made in recent decades, and in this respect I am rehearsing very familiar themes. Nonetheless, such criticisms have not been followed through into a fuller statement about the direction of history itself, and especially the resurgence of older territorial forms, notably those of empire. In the remainder of this paper I will take two steps to flesh out this argument. Firstly reflecting on the project of theorising 'European society', I will suggest that European nation states are themselves returning to a more medieval patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions and claims, pitting privileged, transnationally-organised professionals and managers against other national citizens. Secondly, focusing on the British case, I reflect on how the phenomenon of British 'non-domiciled' tax payers – that is to say British residents who claim on their tax return that their 'permanent home' is somewhere else in the world – is not some odd quirk, but speaks to our contemporary zeitgeist.

## Rethinking European society

Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in what it means to conceive Europe not as a bundle of separate nations, but as some kind of overarching 'society'. The impetus comes from sociological reflections on how the formation of the European Union may be engendering new social forms. Notwithstanding the drama of Brexit, the question of the nature, indeed existence, of European society remains of vital interest. As Adam Tooze (2018) demonstrated, the tensions of the project of European integration were profoundly revealed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, when German decisions about currency guarantees had huge implications across the euro-zone and dramatically intensified long-standing structural inequalities between poorer southern European and richer northern European nations.

Research on Europeanisation has mostly been led by political scientists and economists who have focused on the institutional, legal, and economic aspects of integration within the European Union. By contrast, sociologists have been late to this party, and have generally continued to analyse European

nations as largely autonomous societies. It is only over the past decade, led by pioneers such as Adrian Favell, Neil Fligstein, Patrick Le Gales, Juan Medrano, and Ettore Recchi, that European sociology is now maturing into a powerful current which is exploring the social dynamics of European integration. Much of this work to date has either used qualitative vignettes of strategic sites to consider the integration project on the ground (as with Favell's 2011 *Eurostars and Eurocities*) or has compared survey data from various European nations to elaborate broad trends and possible convergence between them.

An emerging theme is becoming apparent. The consensus is that there are certain ways in which Europe has become an integrating social form, and that the European Union and its associated regulatory structures are not merely of economic or political importance but have generated forms of transcontinental society. This 'social project' is deeply fraught. It is for this reason that one of the leading contributors, Neil Fligstein (2009), prefers the term European 'field', which following its Bourdieusian heritage is more attentive to internal conflicts and tension than the more amorphous term 'society'. Fligstein argues that the European field is trammelled by professionals and managers whose daily work schedules and experiences lead them to interact regularly, and sometimes (in pre-COVID times, at least) travel between different parts of the continent in a familiar and routine way. Professionals and managers in Europe thus increasingly operate on a European transnational stage, in which mobility is both expected and routine (see generally, Recchi et al. 2019). By contrast, less advantaged groups still rely on nationally organised employment relationships and opportunity structures in which they rarely interact or travel outside national boundaries – with the partial exception in some cases of specific holiday locations (as with the notorious exodus of British tourists to Spain). This divide was also underscored by linguistic differentiation in which English became the default language of business and professional interaction across Europe.

This perspective readily leads to a sociological understanding of Brexit – which pitted a largely Europhile professional and managerial class, especially based in the major transnational city of London – against a working class who saw the EU more as an elitist project. The British case also suggests the revival of an imperial project (e.g. Bhambra 2017; Flemmen and Savage 2017; Savage 2021). Here, Fligstein's theme concerning the fractured European field is pertinent. Privileged wealthy classes straddle nations and forge very transnational connections which may intensify divisions within particular nation spaces. They draw on transnational institutions which in turn draw on old imperial connections, such as British-based accounting firms (Buhlmann 2022; Buhlmann et al. 2023). Furthermore, transnational wealth is important in empowering transnational elites. Piketty (2014, Figure 8.4) shows that whereas the bottom 99% of earners in France obtain less than 10% of their income from capital, this rises dramatically in the top percentile to be nearly 60% for those in the top 0.01%. Similar detailed research in the UK has shown how the very highest earners obtain a disproportionate share of income from capital gains and that this income stream has played an especially important role in driving up top incomes over the past decade (Advani and Summers 2020).

Until recently, sociologists have not woken up to these developments because they deploy measures of class and stratification using occupational or some other labour market categorisations drawn from national sample surveys, which do not measure the significance of capital stocks and the income which can be derived from them. This points to a broader problem which I discuss in *The Return of Inequality*, that sociological class analysis itself needs to be radically re-thought because of its association with nationalist modes of analysis. I want to make three points here.

The first, amply attested by social historians and historical sociologists, is that class consciousness is often seen to be bound up with forms of nationalism and national identification. Even sixty years after it was written, E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) remains the iconic discussion, and one which spawned a huge literature comparing class formation across different nations (e.g. Katznelson and Zollberg 1986). Thompson argued that the formation of the English working class in the

period between 1780 and 1830 was not simply the product of industrialisation and structural economic change. Rather, it depended on workers drawing on and sharpening cultural idioms of the 'Freeborn Englishman' which yoked their class consciousness to a sense of English national identity. Thus, the newly conscious working class saw themselves as truly patriotic and needing to wrest authority away from self-serving elites and oligarchs.

There is no need to enter into the details of the extensive historiographical debate which Thompson provoked, such as whether a distinctive English working-class identity existed by 1830 (see e.g. Calhoun 1982; Jones 1983), but his broader argument that class identities are forged in the crucible of nation building has largely been accepted. Historical sociologist Michael Mann (e.g. 1986) has emphasised how class formation in the 19th century was bound up with nationalism and this emphasis has been endorsed by political scientists, notably Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset (1967) who saw class divisions as implicated in the development of stable party cleavages as electoral democracies became institutionalised in modernising nation states.

Secondly, and following on from this, the very conceptualisation and measurement of class itself has been bound up with the national theatre in which classes came to be defined as a means of understanding the nation itself. In Britain, as Simon Szreter (1984) has explored, the Registrar General's model of class, first used in 1911, drew on a gentlemanly status hierarchy in which professionals were superior to business people, and there was a fundamental divide between manual and non-manual workers (see also McKibbin 1998). In France, by contrast, the industrial working class was less central to class thinking, reflecting the greater share of rural and agrarian employment through to the later 20<sup>th</sup> century. Here, the concept of 'cadre' became a key part of thinking about the middle classes following the mobilisation of this group during the 1930s (Boltanski 1982). In the German context, a more differentiated middle class which recognised status gradations amongst different categories of business owners and professionals was also developed (Kocka 1995).

In short, the very understanding of class was both affected by – and also contributed to – the crystallisation of national framings. This was only strengthened by the way that measures of class became enshrined in nationally representative sample surveys (see Savage 2010). In Britain this association can be traced in David Glass's (1954) iconic social mobility study, which deployed one of the first major national sample surveys in the UK adopting the Caradog-Jones occupational schema (which itself drew on the Registrar General's model discussed by Szreter). John Goldthorpe and Chelly Halsey then took this initiative further with the 1972 Nuffield Mobility Study, on the basis of which Goldthorpe et al. (1980) developed their iconic study of *Social Mobility and the Class Structure in Modern Britain*. This pioneered the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portacero) class schema which, with various modifications, was to become the gold standard of international class classifications (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen 2005).

My overarching point here is that a key sociological concept – that of social class – was historically formed through nationally institutionalised modes of measurement and analysis and that we need to radically re-think our conceptual apparatus to allow us to recognise how classes operate across national boundaries and may also articulate different kinds of territorial bonds.

It is only in the past two decades that there has been a serious attempt to develop models of class which can transcend this national framing. Three bodies of research are especially important. First is the emergence of Bourdieusian 'cultural class analysis' which has gathered pace since the mid-2000s. This current of research originated in Scandinavia (Rosenlund 2014; Prieur et al. 2007), and then in France and the UK (Bennett et al. 2009) to explore whether the structuring of cultural capital and distinction which Bourdieu detected in 1960s and 1970s France still applied in the changed conditions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A major theme, summarised by Prieur and Savage (2011, 2013) was the way that 'emerging' forms of cultural capital, which espoused cosmopolitan identities, embracing cultural refer-

ence points outside their national context were eroding nationally-specific social and cultural boundaries. Thus, well-educated professionals and managers generally endorsed books, musical works, films and art works which were not from their own nation, but might articulate cosmopolitan values and multi-cultural diversity. By contrast, the working and 'dominated' classes were more likely to endorse and value cultural works drawn from national frames of reference. Privileged classes were systematically more able to traverse national boundaries. This, of course, returns us exactly to pre-modern forms of cultural hybridity in which religious and intellectual currents traversed territorial boundaries.

Secondly, within urban studies, there has been a growing interest in the 'micro-politics' of European migration amongst the professional and managerial classes. Favell's (2008) *Eurostars and Eurocities* draws attention to the significance of migration of mainly younger and well-educated white Europeans across national borders, and especially to dynamic cities and urban centres – London, Paris, Brussels, and such like. This kind of mobility has been underscored by educational programmes permitting study across different European nations. Favell, as well as Andreotti et al. (2015) emphasise that this intra-European migration is rarely straightforward and that these professional migrants often don't feel they 'belong' to a different nation, so generating a tendency for them to return 'home' later in their lives. These ambivalent professional classes have a strong relationship to city life, seeing large cosmopolitan cities as a central part of their identity – just along the lines of medieval trading cities.

Thirdly, this argument is underscored by studies of transnational elites (Carroll 2009; Hartmann 2010; Savage and Williams 2008; Korsnes et al. 2017; Savage 2021; Savage and Hjellbrekke 2021) which explore how elites are increasingly formed around international axes, especially concerning attendance at 'global' universities and in transnational career hubs (Buhlmann et al. 2023). It is increasingly hard to see the middle and upper classes of most nations in the world as being constrained by the parameters of national boundaries. Rather, their education, occupational and business experience, social lives and cultural interests lead them to interact routinely on some kind of a transnational stage.

This is also apparent from the most elaborate attempt to articulate 'European class analysis' - Hugree et al.'s (2020) *Social Class in Europe*. Their core model of class is derived from a principal components analysis (PCA) examining how 'European Socio-Economic Groups' are clustered across Europe on the basis of their income and work characteristics. Hugree et al. adopt a European version of the approach used by Branko Milanovic (2016) to study global inequality which involves pooling survey data on 273,000 respondents aged 16–65 from across Europe, projecting the patterns at a Europe-wide scale, and then reporting nationally-specific variations as appropriate. This deft move allows them to treat Europe as one social space, not as a combination of varying nations. From this perspective, Europe itself now has its own social dynamics: 'in the context of financialisation of the economy and the triumph of free trade, relations between social classes are largely determined at the European level and no longer simply within a national framework' (p 181).

Their European-wide analysis reveals three major vertically organised classes: (i) a working class of skilled and unskilled manual workers, care workers, and office workers which has been systematically 'weakened' in recent decades; (ii) a middle class of lower professionals, the self-employed, technicians, and service workers which is living on its 'delusions of grandeur'; and (iii) a dominant class of senior managers, elite professionals such as doctors and lawyers, and chief executives. What is innovative about plotting these classes on a European basis is that Hugree et al. can show how these three class divisions are mapped differentially across European space. The working class is concentrated in Southern and Eastern Europe, and the dominant class in the metropolitan heartlands of north-west Europe and Scandinavia. And, rather than Germany being the dominant European 'player', with its industrial might, its strong economy, its large population, and its central location within Europe, it turns out that Europe's dominant class is considerably larger in relative terms in the UK (which turns out to have the highest concentration of 'dominants' of any European nation), as well as in Belgium, the Netherlands,

Luxemburg, Ireland, and Sweden. In short, rather than a Europe of different national social structures, we are returning to a more medieval conception, with complex overlapping jurisdictions and competition between leading powers. Social classes as classically construed in sociological analysis as bound up with purely national framings are thereby receding. History has returned with a vengeance. I will now illustrate this argument through a case study of British non-domiciled tax payers.

## The 'non-dom' phenomenon in the UK


From a modernist perspective it is possible to write Brexit Britain off as some kind of 'failed state' – as no longer able to organise its national affairs coherently and consistently, and thereby failing to demonstrate it is a coherent national project. But, from the perspective I have championed in *The Return of Inequality*, a different argument can be made. Actually, from the point of view of the global wealthy, Britain might be seen as a highly effective neo-imperial regime and serves its purpose well enough. It has an attractive, prestigious and lavish infrastructure in London, as well as iconic rural boltholes, it has prestigious schools and universities, outstanding private services (if you can afford to pay for them) and has become an excellent venue to park your economic assets.

In Britain, 'non-dom' status is available to individuals who, although they may live for much or even all the year in the UK (and hence are 'resident' for tax purposes), also claim that their permanent home ('domicile') is abroad. They are exempted from paying tax on any income earned from outside the UK (so long as it is not remitted to the UK), including not having to pay inheritance tax on overseas assets. Following the logic of the previous paragraph, we might see the British 'non-dom' clause not simply as an odd quirk of the British tax regime, but as a more structural feature which is part of the political infrastructure which allows rich people to disproportionately benefit from residence in the UK. It thus reveals more structural features of British society, in which the non-dom clause is deeply redolent of embedded cultures of class, race and imperial power that continue to operate – and are indeed resurging. It is strange that autonomous nation states allow such a clause, and even more strange that it gives advantages to those who tick this box.

The origins lie in British imperial history. The role of domicile was introduced with the first levying of income tax in 1799 (introduced to fund the Napoleonic Wars). British residents were exempt from paying income tax on their foreign income unless it was remitted to Britain. When income tax was introduced on a major and permanent basis by Lloyd George in 1906, he explicitly brought out its imperial basis: 'the citizen of the empire, who is not domiciled in this country', was exempted from income tax on their overseas income. The scope of this generous provision was curtailed for most UK residents in a series of reforms during the twentieth century but never abolished.

Working with Arun Advani, David Burgherr, and Andy Summers I was the first to systematically research the scale and significance of the phenomenon. We took advantage of the fact that the HMRC, the UK tax authority, necessarily records who is claiming to be a 'non-dom' individual, and we can link this information to their reported income, their geographic location in the UK, their age and sex, and their nationality. It turns out that although relatively few in number, non-doms hugely matter for appreciating the full dimensions of inequality within the UK. Only a tiny proportion – 0.3% – of those with an annual income below £100,000 are non-doms. Therefore the vast majority of British earners are not non-doms. However, above this threshold, the share of non-doms rises dramatically to about 40% of those with an annual income above £5 million. The very highest reaches of the British income distribution are littered with non-dom.

Which parts of the world do non-doms claim is their ‘permanent home? We are increasingly mindful of the significance of imperialism as a force shaping the modern world and this imprint is still very much with us. Figure 1 shows that still today, many non-doms claim links to former imperial nations. Well over half of non-doms claim affiliation to a former imperial territory, and further analysis reveals the significance of Ireland, Canada and the USA; South Africa; India and Australia. We can also see a strong link to European nations, especially the original six nations of the European Union – France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. By contrast, links to the former Soviet nations, or to the Middle East oil territories are much less significant than media stereotypes might imply.



**Figure 1: The share of non-doms reporting affiliations to different nations, 1997 and 2018**

**Notes:** Non-doms are defined as individuals who are UK tax resident in the year of observation and who claimed resident non-domiciled tax status on their tax return in at least one year during the period 1997–2018. Nationality as reported in



Migrant Worker Scan (administrative microdata on migrant workers), supplemented by information from tax form SA109. For individuals reporting both a UK and a foreign nationality, we use the foreign nationality. Non-doms with UK or unknown nationality (who number around 42,000 out of 205,000 in 2018) are excluded.

**Source:** Authors' calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.

It turns out, therefore, that the non-dom clause attracts migrants from nations with predominantly white populations, notably the 'white settler' dominions of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, as well as the USA. There are also substantial numbers with European ties. Immigrants from nations with predominantly non-white populations are much less important, with the striking exception of India where the number of non-doms has expanded rapidly in the past twenty years.

## Conclusions

In this paper I have summarise the arguments of my book *The Return of Inequality*, insisting that we need to broaden our understanding of the modern zeitgeist away from the parameters established by modern nation states. Focusing on the specific case of analysing class divisions, I have stressed how this endeavour is not simply a matter of adjustment, but requires a more systematic re-thinking, in which our very definitions of social class need to be rethought. I have used the particular, but high profile, case of UK non-domiciled tax-payers to reflect on how we need a more nuanced account of how elites are organised on a transnational basis.

This case study supports a broader perspective. We need instead to expand our time horizons and recognise that many of the social forms that have been endemic throughout human history – elite power, city states, imperial territorial forms, and entitlement and patronage – are returning forces. The build-up of capital involves the increasing weight of prior relationships. It is not incidental that the power of these historical forces is gaining increasing attention, as evident in calls for reparations, for redressing the long-term effects of slavery, and for addressing historical abuse and violence of various kinds. It is necessary to push this historical thinking even further by challenging our epochalist assumptions, and I hope my book, and my reflections on how its arguments are endorsed by recent trends, will be a valuable aid to this task.

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